What is “populism”? Some reflections on a commentary by de Ruyter, A. & Hearne, David
What is “populism”? Some reflections 
on a commentary by Matthew Goodwin 
 
By David Hearne and Professor Alex De Ruyter, Centre for Brexit 
Studies 
In a recent commentary[1], the political scientist Matthew Goodwin 
coined the term “national populist” to describe those behind recent 
electoral disruptions throughout the world (of which Brexit is just one). 
Whether the similarity to ‘national socialism’ is coincidental or 
deliberate, the rise of nationalism (and other political movements 
playing on identity) across the globe is surely of particular salience on 
the 100th anniversary of Armistice Day. 
Presumably, the addition of the term ‘national’ is to distinguish 
examples such as Bolsonaro in Brazil or Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) from other movements routinely labelled as “left-
wing populists”, such as Spain’s Podemos, Italy’s 5-Star movement or 
Jeremy Corbyn in the UK. The distinction is important: the defining 
feature of many of these “national populist” movements is their 
nationalism. This is certainly visible in the example of Brexit. 
According to polling data[2], the top 3 reasons why Leave voters voted 
Leave were (in order): 
1. The principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the 
UK 
2. The desire for the UK to regain control over immigration and its 
own borders 
3. Remaining meant little or no choice over how the EU expanded 
its membership or powers 
Leaving aside the dubious factual accuracy of the third point (the UK 
Government has a veto on whether new members can join and 
considerable influence over whether or how EU competencies should 
be increased), the same arguments can be heard again and again. In 
our own research with Leave voting communities, two themes come 
across: firstly that the EU is anti-democratic and secondly there is a 
desire to reduce immigration. These are expressed in myriad ways, a 
concern over the role and powers of courts in Europe, concern over 
the influence of the EU commission, the opacity of decision-making in 
EU institutions, worries over the provision of local services amidst a 
rising population, cultural insecurities, outright racism, and concerns 
about the integration of certain minority communities and many 
others. 
The overwhelming majority of Leave Voters are well aware of the fact 
that regular elections to the European Parliament are held and that 
the UK Parliament ratified the 2009 treaty of Lisbon (as well as the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty). Thus, although the language of being ‘anti-
democratic’ is often used, it is not the necessarily the actual absence 
of democracy to which they are usually referring (although concern is 
expressed over the powers of the EU commission). 
Rather, the allegedly ‘anti-democratic’ nature of the EU is the simple 
fact that EU legislation sits above UK legislation (whether directly via 
regulations or via directives that require the UK parliament to legislate 
to achieve a certain end). In other words, the objection is to the fact 
that irrespective of how the UK votes in a General Election, it can be 
forced to implement certain legislation by virtue of being outvoted in 
the European Council and parliament. Of course, the difficulty of 
reversing legislation that a UK government has previously agreed to is 
another key facet of this. 
This is a logical consequence of the effective functioning of a single 
market. The EU could hardly function effectively if a change of 
government in one state could unilaterally rescind things about 
previous treaties that they decided they didn’t like. Nor is it any 
different to the granting of powers to independent arbitrators in many 
international trade and investment agreements. Nevertheless, 
because the European Single Market is unusually deep and well-
developed (which has led to the economic benefits so prized by many 
Remain voters), it necessarily has led to much deeper political union 
than many Leavers are comfortable with. 
The reasons for this are inextricably linked to the debate over 
immigration. Immigrants (whether from Poland or Pakistan) are not 
seen as part of the national demos. Leavers are very much “national” 
inasmuch as they have a very strong sense of national identity. In a 
previous post[3], we noted that freedom of movement raised particular 
issues around this. This is seen in movements throughout Europe and 
the world, whether Marine Le Pen, Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, 
Viktor Orban, Vladimir Putin, Jair Bolsonaro, the AfD or UKIP. More 
surprisingly, similar sentiments are seen in Scotland and Catalonia 
(where, of course, the demos is seen as Scots or Catalans 
respectively). It is interesting to note in this context that in spite of the 
SNP’s rather liberal stance on migration, Scottish voters appear 
remarkably in tune with their English counterparts[4]. 
Brexit, then, is not the exception, it is the rule – these disruptive 
movements are the new normal. Identity and nationalism are 
important, for better or worse. Ironically, where Goodwin perhaps is 
on much shakier grounds is in his linking of this to the rather nebulous 
term “populism”. What is a “populist”? This is a question that has 
concerned us at CBS, and its dominance in discussions seeking to 
explain Trump, Brexit and the resurgence of right-wing movements in 
general warrants some critical examination of the use and justification 
of this term. 
That “populism” has almost overwhelmingly been used in a pejorative 
sense to describe phenomenon such as the above gives further food 
for thought over the validity of this term – can the rise of Jeremy 
Corbyn in the UK and Bolsonaro in Brazil really be combined under 
the rubric of such a phrase? That commentators in the public domain 
(e.g., Rafael Behr, Natalie Nougayrede, Andrew Rawnsley and 
others) who particularly eschew “populism” could more-or-less be 
described as “liberal-centric” in their views adds a further revealing 
dimension to this debate. 
Traditionally, populism has been defined as a movement that purports 
to represent the “people” or “will of the people” against some imagined 
“elite” who are out of touch with the concerns of the everyday 
person[5]. The term is long-established in political science literature, 
dating back to the 1890s, with the then Populist Party in the US 
championing agrarian interests and anti-monopoly legislation (ibid), 
and the parallel Narodniki movement in the Russian Empire[6]. Of 
course, this raises rather obvious conceptual issues: isn’t the point of 
democracy to represent the will of the people? Don’t most politicians 
seek to be popular (at least insofar as it helps them get re-elected)? 
In conventional modern discourse it has increasingly become defined 
along ethnic or cultural lines and is closely associated with the 
resurgent nationalism described. The problem here is that 
populism also is used to describe movements that have traditionally 
been seen as “left-wing”, including Corbyn but also die Linke in 
Germany, Syriza in Greece, Podemos and 5-star. 
However, seeking to explain Brexit through the lens of “populism” 
(even if referred to as “national populism” to quote Goodwin) is highly 
problematic. Not the least because Brexit, as it has been pushed in 
the UK, has been led by individuals (Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, 
Jacob Rees-Mogg etc.) who under any objective measure of status 
(income, education, wealth, social capital etc.) blatantly qualify as 
“elite” and are at the heart of “the Establishment”. In this situation, it 
might be better to interpret Brexit as the outcome of a conflict within 
elite circles between those who could be classed as market 
fundamentalists seeking to throw off the “shackles” of the EU 
regulatory framework c.f. those who have a modus vivendi with its 
operation (that is, the majority of the corporate community in the UK). 
In this sense, the proponents of Brexit could only be considered as 
“populist” to the extent that they have self-identified against some 
(other) imagined “elite” in order to pursue leaving the EU for motives 
other than their stated ones of “freedom” and “taking back control” – 
and garnered support from a sizable proportion of the electorate in 
doing so. The same is true of Donald Trump, who is an extremely 
wealthy individual. In essence, like Trump, Brexit is might be seen not 
through the lens of populism, but rather as a much more traditional 
nationalist movement, enhanced by the press and supported by 
factions of the elite. That the process has been rather adroitly 
manipulated by those self-same elites should not go unnoticed, but 
fundamentally many of the processes at work are not new. 
Hence, why now? This is the more interesting question and almost 
certainly does relate to many of the factors traditionally identified as 
being at play behind allegedly “populist” movements. It is no 
coincidence that such movements often seem to thrive during times of 
financial distress and rapid change and these are issues to which we 
will return in a later post. 
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